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PRIVATE ORDERING AND THE PROXY ACCESS DEBATE
By Lucian A. Bebchuk ∗ and Scott Hirst ∗ ∗
This Article examines two “meta” issues raised by opponents of the SEC’s proposal to provide
shareholders with rights to place director candidates on the company’s proxy materials. First, opponents
argue that, even assuming proxy access is desirable in many circumstances, the existing no-access default
should be retained and the adoption of proxy access arrangements should be left to opting out of this
default on a company-by-company basis. This Article, however, identifies strong reasons against
retaining no-access as the default. There is substantial empirical evidence indicating that director
insulation from removal is associated with lower firm value and worse performance. Furthermore, when
opting out from a default arrangement serves shareholder interests, a switch is more likely to occur when
it is favored by the board than when disfavored by the board. We analyze the impediments to
shareholders’ obtaining opt-outs that they favor but the board does not, and we present evidence
indicating that such impediments are substantial. The asymmetry in the reversibility of defaults
highlighted in this Article should play an important role in default selection.
Second, opponents of the SEC’s proposed reforms argue that, if the SEC adopts a proxy access
regime, shareholders should be free to opt out of this regime. We point out the tensions between
advocating such opting out and the past positions of many of the opponents, as well as tensions between
opting out and the general approach of the proxy rules. Nonetheless, we support allowing shareholders to
opt out of a federal proxy access regime, provided that the opt-out process includes necessary safeguards.
Opting out should require majority approval by shareholders in a vote where the benefits to shareholders
of proxy access are adequately disclosed, and shareholders should be able to reverse past opt-out
decisions by a majority vote at any time.
The implications of our analysis extend beyond proxy access to the choice of default rules for
corporate elections, and to the ways in which shareholders should be able to opt out of election defaults.
In particular, the current plurality voting default should be replaced with a majority voting default, and
existing impediments to the ability of shareholders to opt out of arrangements that make it difficult to
replace directors should be re-examined.
Keywords: Proxy access, Securities and Exchange Commission, shareholder voting, corporate elections,
corporate governance, directors, default rules, private ordering, boards.
JEL Classifications: G3, G38, K2, K22.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The ability of shareholders to place director nominees on the company’s proxy materials
is an issue that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has been considering for
over sixty years. 1 In its 2009 proposed rule, Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, the
SEC has once again revisited this topic. 2 Specifically, the reform proposes a new rule that would
become Rule 14a-11 (“Rule 14a-11”) of the General Rules and Regulations promulgated under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 3 The proposed Rule 14a-11 would, under certain
circumstances, require companies to include shareholder nominees for director elections in the
companies’ proxy materials. 4
The SEC has received a welter of comments regarding the proposed reform. 5 Although
the adoption of a federal proxy access regime has received significant support from shareholder
groups and those who work with them, 6 the proposed reform faces strong opposition from the
corporate side; comments in opposition have been submitted by many of the country’s largest
corporations, the Business Roundtable, 7 the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 8 and other business

1

See Amended Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-3347, 7 Fed. Reg. 10653 (Dec. 18, 1942).
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-60089, 74 Fed. Reg.
29024 (proposed June 18, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249 & 274) [hereinafter
Proposed Rule].
3
See id. at 29032.
4
Id. at 29032–33.
5
534 comment letters (or memoranda noting meetings with SEC commissioners or staff members) were
received through the end of September 2009. All comment letters are available at U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, Comments on Proposed Rule: Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations,
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009.shtml (last visited Dec. 6, 2009).
6
See, e.g., Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional Investors, to Elizabeth
Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 4, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-78.pdf.
7
See Letter from Alexander M. Cutler, Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, Eaton Corp., and Chair,
Corp. Leadership Initiative, Bus. Roundtable, to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
(Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-267.pdf [hereinafter
Business Roundtable Letter].
8
See Letter from David T. Hirschmann, Senior Vice President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to Elizabeth
Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 14, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-181.pdf [hereinafter Chamber of Commerce Letter].
2
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organizations, as well as many prominent corporate law firms and bar groups. 9 Many of the
commentators opposed to the SEC’s proposal hold the view that proxy access would generally be
value-reducing for publicly traded firms. Whether this is the case was the subject of an exchange
between Martin Lipton and one of us published by The Business Lawyer in 2003, when the SEC
previously considered proxy access reform. 10 This time, however, many commentators also
stress a set of additional “meta-arguments” against the adoption of a federal proxy regime: they
argue that the proposed reform should be opposed even if proxy access is desirable in many or
most publicly traded companies 11 . We focus in this Article on these meta-arguments. We will
refer to those commentators who make one or both of these meta-arguments collectively as the
“Proposal Opponents.” While the views expressed by the Proposal Opponents differ in various
respects, this Article will focus on their common use of the meta-arguments to oppose the SEC’s
proposal.
Part II of this Article focuses on the argument made forcefully by the Proposal Opponents
that, even if proxy access is desirable, it should be adopted in a more limited fashion than
proposed by the SEC—by private ordering against the background of a no-access default rule.
The Proposal Opponents are willing to support the SEC’s proposal to amend Rule 14a-8 to allow
shareholders to place proposals with respect to director nomination procedures on the corporate
ballot; 12 once such an amendment is adopted, they argue, the adoption of proxy access can be
left to private ordering in the marketplace. Such private ordering, they argue, can be expected to
produce a proxy access arrangement in any company in which such access is desirable. Such an

9

See, e.g., Letter from Jeffrey W. Rubin, Chair, Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., ABA Bus. Law
Section, to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 31, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-456.pdf [hereinafter ABA Letter].
10
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43, 48–64
(2003); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea
Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67 (2003). See also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for
Shareholder Access: A Response to the Business Roundtable, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 557, 557–68
(2005).
11
See, e.g., Business Roundtable Letter, supra note 7 at 45-46 (“the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-8
would enable shareholders and companies to implement proxy access provisions that are adapted to the
distinct characteristics and needs of the individual company”). More generally, in advancing arguments
in favor of leaving the adoption of access arrangements to private ordering, Proposal Opponents
presuppose that shareholders of some companies will wish to implement proxy access.
12
See Proposed Rule, supra note 4, 74 Fed. Reg. at 29031.
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argument for retaining the existing no-access default is made not only by many comments in the
SEC file but also by Joseph Grundfest in in a recent discussion paper. 13
We argue that this objection by the Proposal Opponents should be rejected. The Proposal
Opponents are not justified in conflating a preference for private ordering with a preference for
the current no-access default. A preference for private ordering may provide a basis for allowing
opting out of whatever default is selected, but does not favor any specific default. In particular,
assuming that shareholders will be allowed to opt out of the chosen default, we discuss two clear
reasons why a no-access default is inferior to, and dominated by, an access default. First, the
existing empirical evidence and considerations of director accountability suggest that an access
default is more likely to be an efficient arrangement for most public companies. Moreover,
efficient opt-outs are much easier to execute when the board of directors favors opting out than
when it does not. Our analysis of the impediments facing opt-outs to an access regime from a noaccess default indicates that, in many companies where they would be efficient and favored by
shareholders, such opt-outs are likely not to occur—or to occur only after a long and costly
delay.
Having concluded that the SEC should set access as a default, we focus in Part III on the
question of whether opting out of the default to a no-access regime should be permitted, as the
Proposal Opponents forcefully advocate. There is a tension between the Proposal Opponents’
position in favor of allowing opting out of Rule 14a-11 and (i) the opposition most of the
Proposal Opponents expressed in 2007 to facilitating opting out by shareholders from the current
no-access default, and (ii) their support—or tacit acceptance—of shareholders’ inability to opt
out of various arrangements that currently make it more difficult for shareholders to replace
directors. The Proposal Opponents overstate the strength of the case for allowing shareholders to
opt out of the adopted federal access regime. Indeed, precluding such opting out would be
consistent with the long-standing approach of the proxy rules and the securities laws in general.
On balance, however, we support SEC consideration of allowing opting out to no-access,
provided that the opting-out process contains adequate safeguards to ensure that proxy access is
denied only in those cases where shareholders are and remain in favor of opting out. In
13

See Joseph A. Grundfest, The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics, and the Law,
Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 64, available at
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particular, any opting out of the SEC’s access regime should require shareholder majority
approval in a vote in which the benefits to shareholders of an access regime are adequately
disclosed, and shareholders should be able to reverse past opt-out decisions by a majority vote at
any time. Permitting opting out of the SEC’s access regime should also lead to a general
reconsideration of shareholders’ current inability to opt out of arrangements that make it difficult
to replace directors.
The analysis presented in this Article has implications beyond the proxy access debate.
By analyzing the differences in the ease of passing efficient changes when such changes are
supported or opposed by boards, the discussion highlights a consideration that should play an
important role in the setting of corporate governance arrangements in general and those
governing corporate elections in particular. For example, the analysis suggests that majority
voting should become the default arrangement rather than merely a standard from which firms
are free to opt out. Similarly, the analysis of how opting out from Rule 14a-11 should be
conducted has implications for opting out of other rules governing corporate elections.

II. SHOULD NO-ACCESS REMAIN THE DEFAULT RULE?
This Part focuses on the Proposal Opponents’ argument that, even if proxy access is
desirable for the shareholders of many companies, the current no-access default and the adoption
of proxy access arrangements should be left to the marketplace—that is, to private adoption by
individual companies. A no-access default with the freedom to opt in to an access regime is far
from the best response to the proxy access issue. In particular, it is inferior to, and dominated by,
a federal access regime with freedom for shareholders to opt out of proxy access. For the
purposes of this Part’s analysis, we will assume that whatever default rule is chosen—an access
regime or a no-access regime—will allow shareholders to opt out of the rule. And we will focus
on examining whether the case made by Proposal Opponents that the default rule should be noaccess is well grounded. For ease of exposition, we first put forward the case against retaining
the no-access default assuming that shareholders’ preferences are binary—for either the noaccess regime or for the access regime offered by Rule 14a-11; at the end of this Part we
introduce the possibility that shareholders prefer some other access regime and show that the
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1491670, forthcoming in The Business Lawyer..
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case against a no-access default remains strong when this initial simplifying assumption is
relaxed.
Section A of this Part explains why a preference for private ordering should not by itself
lead—as the Proposal Opponents seem to believe—to favoring the current no-access default.
Sections B and C discuss the two main reasons why an access default should be favored: proxy
access is more likely to be efficient for most public companies, and efficient opt-outs are easier
to achieve when the board favors them than when the board does not, making it more difficult for
shareholders favoring proxy access to opt out of a no-access default than it would be for
shareholders favoring no-access to opt out of a federal access regime.

A. The Conflation of Opposition to Proxy Access with Preference for Private Ordering
A central argument put forward repeatedly by the Proposal Opponents is that, even
assuming that access is beneficial for many public companies, the optimal approach is to retain
no-access as the default arrangement and let the provision of shareholder access evolve through
the adoption of access arrangement on a company-by-company basis. 14 To facilitate such
adoption, the Proposal Opponents now endorse a position many of them opposed in 2007:
allowing shareholders to place on the corporate ballot proposals with respect to director
nominations. 15 The Proposal Opponents stress the virtues of “private ordering,” which can tailor
arrangements to companies’ particular circumstances, and seem to believe that a preference for
private ordering and “one size does not fit all” cuts strongly against SEC intervention to provide
a proxy access regime. 16
14

See note 11, supra.
See, e.g., Letter from Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP et al. to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n 4–5 (Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009212.pdf [hereinafter Seven Firm Letter]; ABA Letter, supra note 9, at 4.
16
See, e.g., Seven Firm Letter, supra note 13, at 6–7 (recommending that shareholders be permitted “to
submit proxy access proposals that are designed to fit a company’s particular circumstances” and that
companies would “benefit from the flexibility to adopt the type and form of proxy access standard that
best reflects the will of the stockholders, rather than a uniform, one-size-fits-all standard”); Business
Roundtable Letter, supra note 7, at 45 (suggesting that “permitting shareholders to propose amendments
to a company’s bylaws to facilitate proxy access would allow shareholders to take advantage of the
opportunity that state law affords to tailor a system of proxy access to the needs of the individual
company”).
15
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However, it is a mistake to conflate a preference for private ordering and “one size does
not fit all” with a preference for a no-access default, as the Proposal Opponents do. There is no
reason to assume as the Proposal Opponents do, that private ordering should begin from a noaccess default. A preference for private ordering merely implies a preference for allowing opting
out from whichever default is set, and does not imply that the ideal default is no-access. No
matter what the default rule, it is possible to have private ordering: if the default rule provides for
proxy access, there can be private ordering by allowing corporations to opt out of the regime; 17 if
the default rule is no-access, there can be private ordering by allowing shareholders to opt in to
proxy access. Therefore, although Proposal Opponents base many of their arguments on a
preference for private ordering, such a preference cannot provide a basis for opposition to the
provision of an access regime. A preference for private ordering is fully consistent with a proxy
access regime as long as opting out is permitted by the regime. The Proposal Opponents’
position is thus grounded not in their preference for private ordering but in their preference for a
no-access default over an access default. 18
Grundfest recognizes the need to make an argument in favor of a no-access default, and
he claims that, in choosing among alternative defaults, no-access is the only acceptable choice. 19
He argues that the SEC should not adopt an access default without first conducting a scientific
survey of shareholders in public companies to confirm that shareholders prefer to have proxy
access. 20 This argument implicitly relies on a presumption in favor of a no-access default. We
see no reason for such a presumption. Furthermore, and most importantly, the analysis below
shows that there is a strong basis for favoring an access default over the current no-access
default.
17

Note that allowing opting out of the regime—what Joseph Grundfest refers to as “symmetric opt-out”—
is different from the current proposed Rule 14a-11, which would only allow shareholders to make the rule
less restrictive for shareholder proposals, and not more restrictive (what Grundfest refers to as an
“asymmetric opt-out”). See Grundfest, supra note 12, at 4.
18
The fact that Proposal Opponents have a strong preference not just for private ordering over federal
intervention but also for having no-access as the default is also evident from the fact that nowhere in their
submissions, nor at any time prior to this debate—including during the discussion of the recent
amendment of the Delaware General Corporation Law to add section 112 allowing opting in to proxy
access—did any of the Proposal Opponents seek to have access as the default arrangement under state
law.
19
See Grundfest, supra note 12, at 16.
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B. The Benefits of Proxy Access
In choosing between two or more arrangements for a default rule, a natural starting point
is to ask which arrangement is more likely to be efficient. If it is as easy to opt out of a no-access
default as to opt out of an access default (although we shall see this is not the case), the
consideration of which arrangement is more likely to be efficient in most cases should be
decisive. Both the logic of corporate accountability and the available empirical evidence indicate
that an access default is more likely to be efficient than a no-access default.
Given the central role of directors in corporate governance, their selection and incentives
are important: Corporate law provides shareholders with the power to replace boards in order to
ensure that directors are adequately selected and perform well. 21 This power should create
accountability and incentivize directors to serve shareholders’ interests. 22 However, existing
arrangements make it difficult for shareholders to replace directors, and give incumbents
substantial advantages over outsiders who might seek to replace them in the event of
unsatisfactory performance. For example, incumbents’ campaign expenses are borne completely
by the company, but outsiders have to pay their own campaign costs. 23 Thus, challengers who
might be able to improve the management of the company may be discouraged from running
because they will bear all of the costs but capture only a fraction of the benefits from any
improvement in governance. 24 Electoral challenges are in fact quite infrequent. 25
Although proxy access would not eliminate the disadvantages facing challengers, it
would reduce them somewhat. Challengers would still bear costs that incumbents can charge to
the company, but in some circumstances challengers would avoid the costs of distributing proxy

20

See id. at 23.
See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985) (“If the stockholders are
displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate democracy are at their
disposal to turn the board out.” (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984)).
22
See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (observing that “[t]he
shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power
rests”).
23
See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 394–96 (1986).
24
See id. at 390–96; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal
Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1088–96 (1990).
25
For empirical evidence on the incidence of electoral challenges, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of
the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder Franchise].
21
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cards to shareholders and paying for their return, and would also avoid intangible disadvantages
that may result from being on a separate card. 26 By making it easier for shareholders to replace
directors, proxy access can contribute to making directors more accountable to shareholders and
more attentive to their interests. The primary benefits of proxy access would result not so much
from its use, but from its availability and its general effect on directors’ incentives and behavior.
There is a substantial body of empirical evidence that is consistent with the view that
making boards more accountable by invigorating corporate elections increases shareholder
value. 27 Empirical studies consistently find that proxy fights are associated with an increase in
shareholder wealth. 28 These studies focus on the ex post effects of proxy contests (their effects
on shareholder wealth once a proxy contest has taken place), and do not consider the ex ante
benefits of proxy contests (the effects of the prospect of a proxy contest on boards in general).
Even though these studies therefore focus only on a subset of the benefits of electoral challenges,
their findings are clearly consistent with the effect of such challenges being positive. 29
Furthermore, there is considerable empirical evidence that reducing incumbent directors’
insulation from removal has, overall, a beneficial ex ante effect on the management of public
companies. Empirical studies have found that increased insulation from management removal by
change of control produces poorer management decisions and performance along a significant
number of dimensions. Among other things, there is evidence that:
26

See comments of Roy Katzovicz in Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst eds, The Harvard Law School Proxy
Access RoundtableHarvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper No. 661 (2010), page 55.
27
For a review of this evidence, see Bebchuk, supra note 23, at 711–14.
28
See Lisa F. Borstadt & Thomas J. Zwirlein, The Efficient Monitoring Role of Proxy Contests: An
Empirical Analysis of Post-Contest Control Changes and Firm Performance, FIN. MGMT., Autumn 1992,
at 22; Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Proxy Contests and the Governance of Publicly Held
Corporations, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 29, 30 (1989); Peter Dodd & Jerold B. Warner, On Corporate
Governance: A Study of Proxy Contests, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 402 (1983); David Ikenberry & Josef
Lakonishok, Corporate Governance Through the Proxy Contest: Evidence and Implications, 66 J. BUS.
405, 432–33 (1993); J. Harold Mulherin & Annette B. Poulsen, Proxy Contests and Corporate Change:
Implications for Shareholder Wealth, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 279, 280 (1998).
29
In its comment letter, the RiskMetrics Group indicates that it has tracked the returns of a portfolio of
companies where activists gained board seats in 2005, and found that this portfolio outperformed the S&P
500 index over the subsequent four-year period. See Letter from Martha Carter, Head of Global Research
& Global Policy Bd., RiskMetrics Group, to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 3
(Aug. 14, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-166.pdf [hereinafter
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• The passage of anti-takeover statutes is accompanied by increases in “managerial slack”; 30
• Companies whose managers enjoy more protection from takeovers are associated with poorer
operating performance—including lower profit margins, return on equity, and sales growth—
and are more likely to engage in empire-building; 31
• Acquisitions made by companies with stronger anti-takeover protection are more likely to be
value-decreasing; 32
• Anti-takeover protection is associated with higher compensation levels; 33
• Anti-takeover protection is associated with lower sensitivity of compensation to performance,
and with lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance; 34
• The removal of anti-takeover protection is associated with increases in stock market value; 35
and
• Greater insulation from removal via a takeover is correlated with lower firm value (as
measured by the standard Tobin’s Q measure). 36
To the best of our knowledge, the only empirical study identifying a beneficial aspect of
entrenching management is that by Bates, Becher, and Lemmon. 37 This study found that
RiskMetrics Group Letter] (concluding that it “appears that election of a shareholder-nominated director
may create value over a multi-year period”).
30
See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Is There Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test Using
Takeover Legislation, 30 RAND J. ECON. 535, 545 (1999) (finding that the adoption of antitakeover
statutes weakened managers’ incentives to minimize labor costs); Gerald T. Garvey & Gordon Hanka,
Capital Structure and Corporate Control: The Effect of Antitakeover Statutes on Firm Leverage, 54 J.
FIN. 519, 520 (1999) (reporting that antitakeover statutes “allow managers to pursue goals other than
maximizing shareholder wealth”).
31
See Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J.
ECON. 107, 136–37 (2003).
32
Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns, 62 J. FIN.
1851, 1853 (2007).
33
See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Executive Compensation and Incentives: The
Impact of Takeover Legislation at 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6830, 1998)
(on file with The Business Lawyer).
34
See Olubunmi Faleye, Classified Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial Entrenchment, 83 J. FIN.
ECON. 501, 503 (2007).
35
See Re-Jin Guo, Timothy A. Kruse & Tom Nohel, Undoing the Powerful Anti-Takeover Force of
Staggered Boards, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 274, 275 (2008).
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staggered boards are associated with higher takeover premia.38 However, this study also shows
that staggered boards are associated with a lower likelihood of an acquisition, and, more
importantly, it confirms that, overall, staggered boards are associated with lower firm value. 39
On the whole, the body of empirical evidence provides strong reasons for believing that reducing
the extent to which directors are insulated from removal would be value-enhancing.

C. Default Choice and Reversibility
Having so far focused on whether no-access or access is more likely to be efficient for
most public companies, we now discuss another consideration that weighs heavily against
choosing a no-access default: it would be far more difficult for shareholders to opt out of a noaccess default when doing so would be efficient, than it would for them to opt out of an access
regime when doing so would be efficient.
It is important to take into account the possibility that opting out of different default rules
is not equally easy. In an imaginary Coasian world with no transaction costs, permitting opting
out would always result in an efficient arrangement, no matter what the initial default. In the real
world, however, there are impediments that may prevent efficient opting out, and it is necessary
to consider the possibility that these impediments may vary depending on the default that is
initially chosen. In particular, as was stressed in an article co-authored by one of us together with
Assaf Hamdani, the choice of default in corporate and securities law should depend on which
selection would be more easily “reversible” by shareholders wishing to see it changed. 40 Under
the reversible defaults theory developed in that article, it is important to take into account the fact
that an efficient opting out is easier to accomplish and more likely to occur when a board of

36

See Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 30, at 110; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs
of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 430 (2005); Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell,
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Id. at 675–76.
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directors favors such opting out than when the board disfavors it.41 Below we provide additional
support for this view, explaining in detail the causes of this asymmetry as well as demonstrating
its significance.
When an efficient opt-out is favored by the board, it will likely be adopted. The board
will have an incentive to bring the opt-out proposal to a vote, will have access to internal and
external professionals with the necessary skills to draft and explain the proposal expertly, and
will have the power to place the proposal and detailed reasons for it in the company’s proxy
materials. In contrast, the adoption of an opt-out that is efficient and favored by shareholders but
disfavored by the board will be much more uncertain due to the various impediments we
describe in detail below.
The asymmetry between opt-outs favored and disfavored by the board strengthens the
case for selecting proxy access as the default rule. Indeed, the asymmetry provides a basis for
selecting access as the default even if no-access is more likely to be the efficient default.
Suppose, hypothetically, that proxy access is optimal for 45 percent of companies and no-access
is optimal for 55 percent of companies; suppose further that shareholders are able to opt out in all
cases in which opting out is favored by the board, but only in one-third of those cases in which
opting out is disfavored by the board. In these circumstances, setting an access default would
result in the more efficient arrangement prevailing in all companies: all of the 55 percent of
companies for which the access default is inefficient and disfavored by shareholders will opt out.
In contrast, setting a no-access default would result in 30 percent of companies ending up with
an inefficient arrangement: of those 45 percent of companies for which no-access is inefficient,
only one-third will opt out.
Grundfest recognizes the need to take these asymmetries into account, arguing that they
are reduced in this situation. 42 However, even if this is the case, as long as there is an asymmetry
that makes it easier to opt out of proxy access than to opt in, a default rule of proxy access will
be preferable. Grundfest concedes that where there are asymmetries in favor of management, the
default rule that is less preferred by management should be chosen. 43 However, he claims that,
because the adoption of proxy access could be done by a bylaw amendment without director
41

Id. at 502–03.
See Grundfest, supra note 12, at 23.
43
Id.
42
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initiation, a different recommendation is appropriate. 44 However, the passage that Grundfest
cites for this proposition also states that, where collective action problems impede initiation of
bylaw amendments by shareholders (as this section demonstrates), opting out by a bylaw
amendment will not eliminate the asymmetry, and, as a result, some presumption in favor of
arrangements more restrictive of managers is called for. 45

D. Impediments to Shareholder Bylaw Amendments and the Precatory Proposals Route
Why do the Proposal Opponents expect the marketplace to effectively produce access
arrangements whenever they are efficient? In assessing this question, it is worth noting that
companies have had many years to adopt access bylaws and have not chosen to do so. State
corporate law, including in Delaware, contains no restrictions on allowing shareholder access. 46
However, only three companies have put in place a proxy access arrangement, and each of these
three instances is peculiar because of either the nature of the company or the circumstances
surrounding its adoption of proxy access. One access bylaw was adopted by RiskMetrics Group,
Inc., which advocates proxy access reform for the companies in which its clients invest; 47
another was adopted by a company that had as its chairman and significant block holder a wellknown shareholder activist who has strongly advocated proxy access; 48 the third access bylaw
was adopted by a firm attempting to recover from an option-backdating scandal that led to

44

Id. (citing Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 40, at 505).
See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 40, at 505.
46
Although the introduction of section 112 of the Delaware General Corporate Law makes it explicitly
clear that bylaws may permit proxy access, see 2009 Del. Laws ch. 14, § 1 (Apr. 10, 2009) (H.B. 19)
(West) (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112), the permissibility of such bylaws was generally
recognized prior to the enactment of section 112.
47
See Section 2.6, Second Amended and Restated By-Laws of RiskMetrics Group, Inc. filed as Exhibit
3.2 to Form S-1/A dated January 8, 2008.
48
Apria Healthcare, Inc., had Ralph Whitworth, head of investment advisor Relational Investors LLC, as
its chairman and significant stakeholder during the period in which it adopted a proxy access bylaw. Mr.
Whitworth is a strong advocate of proxy reform, and advocated the change to the board. See Letter from
Ralph V. Whitworth, Principal, Relational Investors LLC, to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n 1 (Aug. 14, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-185.pdf. Apria
Healthcare, Inc., has subsequently been acquired.
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criminal charges against three former executives. 49 It is clear that the implementation of proxy
access in those three cases resulted from unique circumstances.
Why should we expect the future to be different from the past? The Proposal Opponents
seem to believe that the future will be different if the SEC amends Rule 14a-8 (an amendment
they now support) to allow shareholders to place on the corporate ballot proposals concerning
director nomination procedures in general, and proxy access in particular. Shareholders’ ability
to bring such proposals, it is argued, can generally be expected to produce access bylaws in
companies in which such bylaws are efficient and favored by shareholders.
It is worth noting that the process the Proposal Opponents have in mind appears to be one
in which boards adopt access bylaws following shareholder proposals recommending such
bylaws, rather than one in which shareholders adopt such bylaws directly. Although shareholders
submit hundreds of proposals to publicly traded firms each year, the overwhelming majority of
these proposals are precatory in nature; only a small fraction of shareholder proposals are
proposals for binding bylaw amendments. In particular, during the last five proxy seasons, on
average only twelve proposals for corporate governance bylaw amendments were voted on each
year —about 3 percent of the proposals voted on during the season. 50
The use of bylaw proposals is impeded by the fact that, in many firms, the amendment of
bylaws requires a supermajority: as of September 2009, 42 percent of public companies 51 and 34
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In the last two proxy seasons for which Georgeson Shareholder reports figures, the number of proposals
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percent of the Fortune 500 required a supermajority approval for any shareholder-initiated
bylaws. 52 Indeed, even among companies that do not have a supermajority requirement, the
standard requirement of approval by a majority of the outstanding shares makes passage
conditional on obtaining a supermajority of the votes cast.
Furthermore, the initiation of access bylaws by shareholders would be discouraged by the
fact that Rule 14a-8 imposes a 500-word limit on the text of the proposed bylaw and the
supporting statement. 53 It might well be difficult to fit the text of an access bylaw that explicitly
addresses most of the relevant elements (not to mention the supporting statement) within such a
limit. 54 For example, the model access bylaw recently put forward by the American Bar

http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/The%20Limits%20of%20Private%20Ordering%20UPDATED%201117-09.pdf (showing that 36.1 percent of Russell 1000 companies, 39.1 percent of Russell 3000
companies, and 35.4 percent of S&P 500 companies employ a supermajority vote standard). That paper
also suggests that another impediment to private ordering will exist for companies with multiple class
capital structures with disparate voting rights (7.1 percent of S&P 500 companies, 8.8 percent of Russell
1000 companies, and 7.5 percent of Russell 3000 companies), such that an access bylaw favored by
shareholders holding a majority of the shares of the company by value may not receive a majority of total
votes. Id. at 8.
52
This figure is based on a SharkRepellent.net search on September 6, 2009. Out of the Fortune 500
companies, 168 companies had a supermajority vote requirement for amending the bylaws of the
corporation.
53
See Proposed Rule, supra note 2, 74 Fed. Reg. at 29046.
54
A shareholder wishing to have an access bylaw might believe, for example, that such a bylaw should
ideally deal with, among other things, ownership and shareholding requirements of proponents, disclosure
of information, and resolution procedures.
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Association Task Force on Shareholder Proposals contains 2,436 words, 55 and the text of Rule
14a-11 itself contains 1,929 words. 56
The Proposal Opponents have not expressed concerns about these considerable
impediments to shareholder-initiated access bylaws. To make their support of opting out against
the background of a no-access default tenable, they have to rely on the ability of shareholders to
pass precatory shareholder resolutions recommending that the board adopt an access bylaw.
Once Rule 14a-8 is amended to allow such precatory proposals, it might be argued, the boards of
many companies can be expected to adopt access bylaws after the passage of such proposals or
in anticipation of—and with a desire to preempt—the future passage of such proposals. 57
However, as the next subsections demonstrate, this process also cannot generally be relied upon
to produce proxy access arrangements whenever shareholders prefer to have them.

E. Lessons from Majority Voting and Staggered Boards
It is instructive to begin by looking at the evidence on the diffusion of majority voting
arrangements, which were often adopted by boards in response to or in anticipation of
shareholder resolutions in favor of majority voting. In arguing that private ordering from a noaccess default could be relied on to produce proxy access arrangements whenever they would be
55

See AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS, ILLUSTRATIVE ACCESS BYLAW WITH
COMMENTARY
(June
15,
2009),
available
at
http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/CL410000/sitesofinterest_files/illustrative_access_by
law.pdf [hereinafter ABA MODEL BYLAW]. To take another example, the model bylaw circulated by
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz contains 1,401 words. See WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, MODEL
PROXY ACCESS BOARD RESOLUTION AND BY-LAW (May 7, 2009), ,available at
http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.16648.09.pdf
[hereinafter
Wachtell, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ MODEL BYLAW]. This model bylaw is discussed in Posting by
Theodore Mirvis to Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation,
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/05/24/secs-proxy-access-proposal-undermines-state-federalbalance/ (May 24, 2009, 7:24 EST) (“SEC’s Proxy Access Proposal Undermines State-Federal Balance”).
Word counts were calculated in Microsoft Word after cutting and pasting the text of the bylaws (including
section numbering, but excluding footnotes and explanatory text).
56
See Proposed Rules, supra note 4, 74 Fed. Reg. at 29082–85. The number of words was calculated in
Microsoft Word after cutting and pasting the text of Rule 14a-11 from the original PDF files version. The
word count includes section numbering and section headings but excludes titles, footnotes, explanatory
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efficient, the Proposal Opponents argue that the widespread adoption of majority voting from the
plurality voting default via private ordering demonstrates that private ordering can produce
desirable election reforms. 58 The Business Roundtable Letter, for example, refers to the “swift
adoption” of the majority voting standard, and states that some form of majority voting had been
adopted by 75 percent of the Roundtable’s members by 2008. 59
In fact, however, the empirical evidence on the diffusion of majority voting highlights the
limits of relying on private ordering by firms, rather than on a change in default arrangements, to
produce necessary reforms. Consider a hypothetical situation in which majority voting is the
default arrangement from which firms can opt out only with shareholder approval. Given the
strong support for majority voting among investors, 60 it is likely that the overwhelming majority
of companies would not be able (and indeed would not try) to get shareholders to approve opting
out of majority voting into plurality voting, and that most public firms would have majority
voting in place. This is a very different outcome than that produced by firms opting out of the
current default of plurality voting.
In fact, several years after the widespread recognition of the desirability of a majority
voting standard, a large fraction of public firms, including a large majority of smaller public
firms, have not yet opted into majority voting. As of September 2009, data from RiskMetrics
Group shows that only 60 percent of companies in the S&P 500 had majority voting (with an
additional 15 percent having plurality voting with a director resignation policy), and that only a
small minority of the large number of public companies outside the S&P 500 have majority
voting. 61 Of the 5,930 firms outside the S&P 500 that are followed by RiskMetrics Group, only
12 percent have majority voting (an additional 5 percent had plurality voting with a director
resignation policy). 62 Altogether, of the 6,630 public firms in the RiskMetrics database, more
57

See, e.g., Seven Firm Letter, supra note 13, at 1; ABA Letter, supra note 9, at 4; Business Roundtable
Letter, supra note 7, at 3.
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than 80 percent have plurality voting without even a resignation policy for directors receiving a
majority of withhold votes. 63
The above evidence indicates that, as long as the default arrangement remains the same,
many public firms can be expected to avoid opting out into arrangements that make director
removal easier—even when there is strong support for such arrangements among shareholders.
We discuss below in detail the reasons why private ordering cannot be relied upon to produce
such governance improvements. The lessons from the incomplete diffusion of majority voting
are worth keeping in mind while considering that analysis.
Indeed, if the adoption of proxy access arrangements is left up to firms opting in to such
arrangements, shareholders’ ability to implement the access arrangements they favor is likely to
face even greater obstacles than those faced by majority voting. Most importantly, boards have
generally displayed much more resistance to proxy access than to majority voting. In the
beginning of this decade, both proxy access and majority voting were considered important
measures for addressing growing concerns about corporate governance in general and corporate
elections in particular. 64 Both at the time and since, companies have been open to considering
and adopting majority voting, but have been strongly opposed to proxy access. 65 What might be
the reasons for the difference in corporate attitudes? Perhaps incumbent directors and executives
find majority voting less threatening because it does not create risks that outsiders not screened
and selected by the incumbent team will join the board, or perhaps reasonable and persuasive
objections to majority voting are difficult to identify. Whatever the reason, incumbent directors’
resistance to proxy access arrangements should be taken into account in any assessment of the
expected incidence of the adoption of such arrangements from a no-access default.
Furthermore, in contrast to majority voting arrangements, the design of proxy
arrangements seems to be more complicated and their consequences seem to depend on many
63
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more design details. 66 As a result, as discussed in detail below, 67 firms have many ways to
design proxy access arrangements that in practice make their use by shareholders very difficult.
This consideration is especially important given the expected reluctance of boards to adopt proxy
access arrangements that could make a practical difference.
The evidence of staggered boards is also instructive in assessing how difficult it is for
shareholder preferences, expressed in precatory shareholder proposals, to produce widespread
changes that would make it easier to replace directors. For the last two decades, companies have
generally not been able to get shareholders to approve the adoption of staggered boards.. 68
Moreover, shareholders have displayed strong preferences for the removal of staggered boards
where companies already have them in place. Proposals in favor of de-staggering have obtained,
on average, more than 70 percent of the votes cast for such proposals in each of the years 2003 to
2009, with the average percentage of support in 2007 and 2008 reaching levels of 86 percent and
80 percent respectively. 69 This opposition by shareholders has led to de-staggering by a
significant number of companies, though most of the companies with staggered boards have
stuck to an arrangement that does not have majority support among shareholders. Among the
(approximately) 4,000 public firms whose antitakeover arrangements are tracked by
SharkRepellent.net, about half still have staggered boards in place.70 This evidence suggests that
strong impediments exist to shareholder efforts to make corporate governance changes that
would facilitate replacing directors. We now turn to a discussion of these impediments in some
detail.

shareholders and advisory services to impose significant costs on all shareholders, often for reasons
wholly unrelated to sound corporate governance or the welfare of the corporation.”).
66
See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
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See infra notes 82–87 and accompanying text.
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See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PENN. L. REV.
713, 727-8 (2003); Michael Klausner, Institutional Shareholders, Private Equity, and Antitakeover
Protection at the IPO Stage, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 759–61 (2003).
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F. Impediments to the Effectiveness of the Precatory Proposals Route
The Proposal Opponents claim that a no-access default regime with freedom to opt in to
proxy access will produce access arrangements whenever they are favored by shareholders. The
evidence discussed above casts doubt on this claim. This subsection discusses three reasons for
expecting that a no-access default that allows shareholders to include proposals concerning proxy
access on the corporate ballot will not result in the adoption of such arrangements in all firms
whose shareholders would benefit from them.
First, due to the limited incentives shareholders have to make proposals, most companies
will not receive, and will not expect to receive, shareholder proposals to adopt a proxy access
arrangement, even when such proposals would pass were they initiated. Second, even if proxy
access proposals are passed (or are expected to pass), boards may elect not to follow
shareholders’ explicit preference in favor of proxy access. Third, even in those cases where
boards adopt a proxy access bylaw—either in response to or in anticipation of the passage of a
shareholder proposal—the board may adopt a version of an access arrangement that is
substantially more diluted and restrictive than shareholders favor.

1. The Limited Reach of Precatory Proposals
The Proposal Opponents implicitly assume that companies whose shareholders would
pass a proxy access proposal, were one to be initiated, would receive or expect to receive such a
proposal. But the fact that a proposal would be passed if initiated hardly implies that a proposal
will be initiated. Most shareholders have little incentive to initiate such proposals, and the
evidence clearly indicates that shareholder proposals that routinely receive large shareholder
support are initiated in only a small subset of relevant companies. Although it takes only one
shareholder to initiate a proposal, most firms do not receive even a single shareholder proposal.
In particular, according to an analysis of RiskMetrics Group data, less than 25 percent of
the firms in the S&P 1500 were targeted for corporate governance proposals in each of the years
2006 and 2007. 71 The RiskMetrics shareholder data focuses on S&P 1500 companies because
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shareholder corporate governance proposals are infrequent in other companies. 72 According to
this data, about 50 percent of the S&P 500 firms received such proposals (243 in 2006 and 265 in
2007). 73 Among those S&P 1500 firms not in the S&P 500, only about 10 to 12 percent received
corporate governance proposals (101 in 2006 and 121 in 2007). 74 Note also that, even though
proposals to de-stagger boards and to adopt majority voting routinely pass when initiated in
companies with a staggered board and plurality voting (respectively), such proposals are initiated
only in a small subset of such firms each year. Thus, there is a good basis for expecting that, in a
no-access default regime, many companies—including most companies outside the S&P 500—
will not expect to be the target of a proxy access proposal, even if such a proposal would pass
were it to be initiated, and thus the boards of those companies will face little pressure to adopt an
access arrangement. 75

2. Precatory Proposals May Be Ignored
As discussed in section D of this Part, the process that the Proposal Opponents envisage
is that shareholders will propose precatory resolutions to implement proxy access. However,
when a precatory resolution in favor of proxy access passes, the board may elect not to follow it.
As a legal matter, the passage of a precatory resolution does not bind the board—the board is
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legally free to elect to retain the existing state of affairs. 76 As a practical matter, the chance that a
board will fail to follow a successful precatory resolution is likely to be greater if the resolution
is the first proposal on the subject passed by the company’s shareholders, if the issue is
especially important to incumbents, 77 and if the resolution passes without a large majority.
This analysis is consistent with the evidence of boards’ failure to follow numerous
precatory resolutions passed in favor of de-staggering boards. A study by one of us shows that,
of the precatory resolutions passed by shareholders during the period 1997–2003, boards elected
not to follow about 69 percent of such resolutions by the fall of 2004.78 Recent evidence suggests
that the incidence of boards failing to implement de-staggering proposals is now lower—possibly
as a result of the consistently large support for such resolutions recently—although a significant
number of firms still continue to have staggered boards despite the passage of one or more
shareholder resolutions in favor of de-staggering. 79 Thus, even in the event that shareholders pass
resolutions in favor of proxy access in some companies, some boards can be expected to ignore
such resolutions, and the incidence of such refusals is likely to be higher during the initial years
in which proxy access resolutions are passed and when such resolutions pass with less than
overwhelming majorities.

3. Precatory Proposals May Be Only Partly Followed
There is another reason why the process suggested by the Proposal Opponents cannot be
expected to result in the proxy arrangements favored by shareholders of particular companies
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being universally adopted by those companies. Even if the board elects to adopt an access bylaw
in response to (or in anticipation of) the passage of a precatory shareholder resolution favoring
proxy access, the board may choose to adopt a bylaw considerably more restrictive than the
arrangement favored by shareholders. By adopting an access bylaw, the board can claim to
accommodate its shareholders’ preference. However, the devil is in the details, and the bylaw
adopted by the board may fall significantly short of that favored by shareholders. 80
In response to (or in anticipation of) shareholder resolutions in favor of a majority voting
standard, for example, some boards have nonetheless retained the default plurality standard but
have sought to placate shareholders by adopting a “director resignation policy.” 81 Such policies
require directors receiving a majority of “withhold” votes to tender their resignations, but fall
short of a majority voting standard, as they are binding neither on directors (to tender their
resignations), nor on the board (to accept tendered resignations). During the 2009 proxy season,
directors of Pulte Homes, Inc., and Dollar Tree, Inc., failed to receive a majority of votes cast,
yet even though both companies had director resignation policies that were triggered by the
votes, their boards decided not to accept the resignations of the directors. 82 As noted above,
RiskMetrics Group data indicates that 15 percent of companies in the S&P 500 (and 5 percent of
all companies followed by RiskMetrics Group) have director resignation policies but not
majority voting rules. 83
This problem is especially significant for proxy access bylaws. As discussed above, the
design of a proxy access arrangement can critically affect its effectiveness in providing
shareholders with meaningful access to the company’s proxy materials. It is possible to draft
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proxy access arrangements with thresholds and requirements that largely negate their potential
value for shareholders.
To illustrate, consider a company whose board passes a bylaw based on the model access
bylaw put forward by Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. 84 An examination of the fine details of
the model bylaw indicates that it provides access in name only. First, it requires a nominator to
have more than 5 percent of the voting shares of the corporation (a “5% shareholder”) and does
not allow shareholder groups to aggregate their holdings for this purpose. 85 As a result, if the
company lacks 5 percent shareholders, or if the 5 percent shareholders are affiliated with
management, there will effectively be no shareholder access to the ballot. Second, although the
model bylaw theoretically allows shareholders to place on the ballot nominees numbering up to
one-third of the number of board seats, 86 each 5 percent shareholder may nominate only one
director. 87 Therefore, to have three shareholder nominees included on the ballot of a company
with nine directors, the company must have at least three 5 percent shareholders, each of which
must elect to exercise its proxy access rights. Finally, the model bylaw also deters the use of
proxy access rights by 5 percent shareholders by making such use quite costly: shareholders
exercising their right to nominate a director are precluded from nominating directors or soliciting
proxies in the following year 88 and are subject to substantial limitations on their ability to sell
shares, imposing a significant loss of liquidity. 89 The adoption of a bylaw with such tight
restrictions should hardly be viewed as providing shareholders with meaningful proxy access.
84
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G. Different Access Regimes
We have so far assumed for the purposes of this Part that shareholders’ preferences are
binary, for either the access arrangement specified by a federal access regime or no-access. The
Proposal Opponents stress that “one size does not fit all” and that companies vary considerably
in their characteristics and circumstances. We now consider the possibility that optimal access
regimes, and those preferred by shareholders, may differ among companies. We conclude that,
also under this assumption, an access default would be preferable to retaining a no-access
default.
We continue to assume that shareholders will be free to opt out of whichever default rule
is chosen. In Part III we discuss in detail the manner in which shareholders should be permitted
to opt out of a federal access regime. Under the SEC’s proposal, firms would be able to adopt
bylaws that provide more expansive access rights than provided by the federal access regime. As
will be explained in more detail in Part III, we also support allowing shareholders to adopt
resolutions opting out of the federal access regime. Thus, a firm would be able to substitute an
access regime with more restrictive access rights than provided in the federal access regime by
(i) passing a shareholder resolution to opt out of the federal access regime, and (ii) as the
company would no longer be governed by the federal access regime, adopting a bylaw providing
the desired set of access rights.
Consider a set of companies whose shareholders prefer access regimes (which might vary
from company to company) that provide access rights that are more restrictive than those
provided by the federal access regime. Each of these access regimes may be viewed as being
located on a spectrum between no-access and the federal access regime. In the view of the
Proposal Opponents, a no-access default should be the baseline from which shareholders of any
given company in the set opt out to the access arrangement that they prefer. However, setting the

Interest of voting securities of the Corporation so as to reduce the Beneficial Ownership and Economic
Interest held by such [nominating shareholder], together with its Affiliates, below the [5 percent]
Required Interest on or prior to the date of the Election (and representing that they have no present
intention of reducing, within one year following the Election, their aggregate Beneficial Ownership and
Economic Interest below the greater of (x) the [5 percent] Required Interest and (y) seventy-five percent
(75%) of their aggregate Beneficial and Economic Interest as of the Advance Notice Date)”).
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federal access regime as a default would be more likely to result in a given company becoming
subject to the access arrangement preferred by its shareholders.
The reason for this is the asymmetry discussed above between opting out in a direction
favored by incumbent directors and opting out in a direction disfavored by incumbent directors.
Because of this asymmetry, if a no-access default is retained, many firms whose shareholders
prefer an access arrangement would likely remain without such an arrangement. In contrast, if a
federal access regime is set as a default, and the shareholders of a company prefer an access
regime that provides more restrictive access rights, a change to the shareholders’ preferred
regime would be more likely. Such a change would be likely to take place since it would be
favored not only by the shareholders but also by the directors, and the board could therefore be
expected to ensure that shareholders have the chance to vote on a resolution to opt out of the
federal access regime and adopt a bylaw providing the desired access arrangement (or the board
could pass such a bylaw themselves). We conclude that the case for a no-access default is not
strengthened by recognizing that “one size does not fit all” and that the optimal access regime
that shareholders prefer varies among companies. Instead, the impediments to opting out in a
direction disfavored by directors make a no-access default an inferior starting point for moves to
optimal access arrangements.
More generally, assuming a federal access regime is provided as a default, and that
shareholders are permitted to opt out to both more and less restrictive access rules, the above
analysis indicates that changes to access rules preferred by shareholders of particular companies
are less likely to occur where shareholders prefer more expansive access rights than provided by
the federal regime, than where shareholders prefer less expansive access than provided by the
federal regime. This conclusion provides an important insight concerning the setting of the
various dimensions of the federal access regime, such as eligibility thresholds and procedural
requirements for nominating directors. The SEC should not design the default access regime in
accordance with what it believes to be optimal for the “average” publicly traded company.
Because it would be more difficult for shareholders seeking changes to expand access rights than
to restrict them, the optimal default rule will be one that provides more expansive access rights
than are likely to be optimal for the “average” company.
Thus, although a discussion of the design of the various detailed dimensions of the
federal access regime is beyond the scope of this Article, our analysis of private ordering and the
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proxy access debate suggests an important consideration for such an analysis. The design of the
federal access regime should err on the side of providing meaningful access rights. This would
result in more companies becoming subject to the exact access arrangements preferred by their
shareholders.

H. An Access Regime Should Be the Default
The above analysis and empirical evidence clearly demonstrates the limitations of the
process on which Proposal Opponents wish to rely as a substitute for a federal access regime.
Retaining a no-access default and leaving the adoption of proxy access arrangements to
company-by-company adoption cannot be expected to result in the general adoption of proxy
access arrangements by all of the public companies whose shareholders would favor such an
arrangement. Among the thousands of public companies, many—possibly most—will avoid
adopting a proxy access arrangement, at least for several years, and a number of those companies
adopting proxy access arrangements will implement details that are significantly more restrictive
than those favored by their shareholders.
It should be stressed that the outcome for public companies as a whole is likely to be
even worse than the percentage of companies failing to adopt proxy access arrangements favored
by their shareholders would suggest. That is, the companies that will avoid adopting proxy
access arrangements are likely to be among those whose directors are already less accountable to
shareholders and less attentive to shareholder interests—in other words, the companies for which
effective proxy access is especially important.

I. Beyond Proxy Access
Although we have so far focused on proxy access, the analysis in Part II has implications
that go beyond proxy access—in particular, for the choice of default arrangements with respect
to other election arrangements. As detailed above, the empirical evidence suggests that
subjecting directors to enhanced risk of removal in the event of underperformance can be
expected to increase shareholder value. Given the centrality of election arrangements to the
corporate structure, public officials would do well to reconsider whether existing arrangements
that insulate directors from removal are warranted.
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We have also analyzed the impediments to shareholders forcing companies to opt in to
arrangements favored by shareholders but disfavored by boards, and have discussed evidence
showing how these impediments substantially limit the speed and efficacy of adopting such
arrangements. Our analysis lends support to the “reversible defaults” analysis put forward earlier
by one of us together with Assaf Hamdani. 90 In selecting default arrangements, public officials
should take into account the fact that a switch from an inefficient default to a more efficient
arrangement that would be favored by shareholders is more likely to occur when such a switch is
favored by the board than when it is disfavored. This consideration should be given significant
weight when defaults are initially selected, and also whenever they are re-examined.
In addition to changing the default rule that currently denies shareholder director
nominees access to the corporate ballot, other defaults should be re-examined with the above
considerations in mind. For example, we believe there is a strong basis for replacing the current
default of plurality voting with a majority voting default. Although there is now widespread
recognition that majority voting should be the standard for director elections, we have shown that
its diffusion has been much more limited than is commonly supposed: as noted above, a
substantial number of S&P 500 companies, and a large majority of the thousands of public
companies outside the S&P 500, remain subject to plurality voting. This is due to the difficulties
of getting public companies, and especially smaller companies that are not usually the target of
shareholder proposals, to adopt arrangements favored by shareholders but not by boards of
directors.
Accordingly, it is not sufficient to allow companies to opt in to majority voting. As long
as plurality voting remains the default, many if not most public companies will be governed that
way, even if their shareholders prefer majority voting and would not support plurality voting if
asked to vote on the matter. Switching to a majority voting default, which will contribute to
improving corporate elections, is therefore warranted.

III. SHOULD SHAREHOLDERS BE ALLOWED TO OPT OUT OF THE FEDERAL ACCESS REGIME?
Part II of this Article concluded that there is a strong case for replacing the current noaccess default with a proxy access default. Because state law has failed to provide proxy access
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See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 40.
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arrangements, federal law should provide a proxy access default rule. We now consider whether
and to what extent opting out of a federal access regime should be permitted.
The Proposal Opponents argue forcefully in favor of allowing opting out; this is the
position taken by the Business Roundtable Letter, 91 the Seven Firms Letter, 92 and by the letters
of numerous law firms 93 and corporations. 94 Indeed, Grundfest goes so far as to claim that an
SEC rule that did not allow opting out would be irrational, to such a degree that it would fail the
rationality test of the Administrative Procedure Act. 95
Section A begins by pointing out the inconsistencies between the Proposal Opponents’
strong support for the ability to opt out of a proxy access regime and (i) their prior positions
against the ability to opt out of the current no-access regime when the SEC considered allowing
such opting out in 2007, and (ii) their acceptance of mandatory arrangements making it difficult
for shareholders to replace directors, from which shareholders are not permitted to opt out. We
also note that the Proposal Opponents overstate the strength of the case for allowing opting out,
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and that preventing opting out in a way that would dilute the protections accorded to
shareholders by the proxy access regime is consistent with the general structure of the proxy
rules. In Section B we turn to our own position on the subject. Although prohibiting opting out
that would weaken shareholder rights would not be unreasonable, we support allowing opting out
of the proxy access regime in both directions—provided, however, that such opting out is done
by a process that contains certain important elements and conditions. We also argue that
allowing opting out of proxy access should be accompanied by a reconsideration of existing rules
that prevent shareholders from opting out of arrangements that make replacing directors more
difficult.

A. Some Questions About the Proposal Opponents’ Position on Opting Out
The Proposal Opponents present a forceful defense of shareholders’ right to opt out of
proxy access rules. 96 The Seven Firm Letter, for example, stresses that depriving shareholders of
their right to opt out of the access regime would be “wrong as a matter of policy.” 97 This
recognition of the value of shareholder choice expressed by corporations and corporate law firms
is welcome and encouraging. However, it is interesting to observe that many of the Proposal
Opponents seem more inclined to allow opting out of arrangements making it easier to replace
directors than opting out of arrangements making it difficult to replace directors. Their
underlying position seems to be guided not by the view that permitting opting out is desirable,
but rather by the view that director removal should be difficult.
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Two inconsistencies in particular are worth discussing. First, the Proposal Opponents’
current position in favor of allowing opting out conflicts with the position many of them
expressed in 2007 when the SEC considered allowing shareholders satisfying certain eligibility
standards to include on the corporate ballot proposals to opt out of the current no-access default
(the “2007 Shareholder Proposal Rule”). 98 Although the Proposal Opponents now argue strongly
that shareholders should be allowed to opt out of any access regime, in 2007 many of them—
including the Business Roundtable, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and a number of prominent
corporate law firms—strongly opposed allowing shareholders to include proposals to opt out of
the current no-access rule on the corporate ballot. 99 For example, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, in a comment letter regarding the 2007 Shareholder Proposal Rule, indicated that it
“strongly oppose[d] the [2007 Shareholder Proposal Rule] as unnecessary, overreaching and
potentially disruptive and harmful to companies and shareholders.” 100 At the time, the strong
opposition to allowing shareholders to opt out of the current no-access default prevailed, and the
SEC adopted the current rule allowing companies to exclude opt-out proposals. 101
Comparing the positions of many Proposal Opponents in 2007 with their positions today,
it seems that the fundamental principle underlying their current position is not that of permitting
shareholders to opt out and choose the arrangements they find most fitting. Rather, the position
98
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of these Proposal Opponents regarding opting out seems to depend on the nature of the default
arrangement in place: they strongly support opting out when proxy access is the default, but
strongly oppose opting out when no-access is the default. Although these Proposal Opponents
have reversed their 2007 position and now support allowing shareholders to opt out of the
current no-access default, this new position seems in reality to be part of an effort to avoid the
adoption of a stronger proxy access regime by the SEC.
The second tension worth noting is between the Proposal Opponents’ opposition to a
proxy access regime that does not allow shareholders to opt out, and their acceptance of various
arrangements that make it difficult for shareholders to replace directors, from which
arrangements shareholders cannot opt out. Such arrangements have long existed under both
federal law and state corporate law. For example, several of the federal proxy rules introduced in
the 1950s with respect to consent solicitations have long made mounting proxy challenges more
difficult and more costly. 102 Similarly, state law includes mandatory rules that prevent
shareholders from initiating charter amendments. 103 To the best of our knowledge, none of the
Proposal Opponents now championing opting out by shareholders from proxy access have
expressed dissatisfaction about shareholders’ inability to opt out of current arrangements that
make it difficult to replace directors, or has proposed changes to facilitate such opting out. This
is again consistent with the Proposal Opponents’ fundamental commitment to arrangements that
make electoral challenges more difficult rather than to arrangements that facilitate private
ordering and opting out.
Finally, before proceeding, we should note that the Proposal Opponents substantially
overstate the strength of the case for allowing opting out. The Proposal Opponents suggest that
there can be no justification for not permitting opt-outs that would dilute the rights provided by a
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federal access regime. 104 In fact, both state corporate law and federal securities law establish
protections for shareholders, both in general and with respect to corporate elections, which
shareholders cannot vote to dilute. 105 There is also a substantial body of academic work that
identifies and discusses at length various reasons for adopting minimum standards of investor
protection as mandatory rules from which opting out is not permitted. 106
Moreover, it should be noted that the longstanding approach of the shareholder proposals
rule has been to provide shareholders with minimum rights of access to the company’s proxy
card for their proposals, and to allow companies to provide shareholders with additional rights,
but not to derogate from the set minimum. 107 More generally, the proxy rules—and the securities
laws in general—have long provided mandatory arrangements establishing a minimum level of
protection for public investors, allowing companies to add additional protections, but not to
reduce investors’ protections below the established minimum. Thus, an “asymmetric opting out”
arrangement that allows opting out of the federal proxy access regime only to expand
shareholder rights but not to weaken such rights would be consistent with the longstanding
structure of the federal securities laws.

B. Opting out of the Federal Access Regime
Although there is therefore a reasonable basis for supporting asymmetric opting out, we
believe that the SEC should consider allowing “symmetric opting out”—that is, opting out of the
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proxy access regime either to strengthen or weaken the access rights of shareholders. One of the
factors motivating us to take this position is the inevitable uncertainty about the optimal
eligibility thresholds for proxy access in any given company. We believe that the difficulties
shareholders face in opting out of default rules in the “direction” disfavored by the board—that
is, toward less restrictive requirements for access—make it desirable to set reasonably low
eligibility thresholds for the access default. However, if eligibility thresholds are set at a
reasonably low level, it may be desirable in turn to allow shareholders to tighten those
requirements if they consider more restrictive requirements to be preferable.
However, any opting out of the federal access regime should be permitted only if the
opting-out process is designed in such a way that companies are released from the federal access
regime if and only if their shareholders prefer a different arrangement. Below we discuss several
principles that should govern such an opt-out process.

1. Opting Out Only by Majority Shareholder Approval
We believe that boards of directors should not on their own be able to opt out of
governance arrangements that make it more difficult to replace incumbent directors. 108 Thus,
companies should not be able to opt out of a federal access regime by means of board-adopted
bylaws. In our view, the federal access regime should allow opting out only by a shareholder
resolution passed by shareholders representing a majority of the outstanding shares. 109 Boards
should be free to initiate a vote on such a resolution, as should shareholders. With boards free to
initiate votes on opt-out resolutions, such votes are likely to occur whenever passage of such optout resolutions is likely—that is, whenever a majority of the shareholders prefer to opt out of the
access regime. Such opt-out resolutions, in their most basic form, would merely remove from the
company’s shareholders the access rights provided by the federal access regime. However, as
will be discussed below, such resolutions could be accompanied by proposals to adopt bylaws
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that would provide alternative access rights distinct from those conferred by the federal access
regime.

2. Shareholder Ability to Reverse Earlier Opt-Out Decisions
The process for opting out by shareholders from a federal access regime should leave the
door open for shareholders to later reverse their choice and opt back in to proxy access.
Shareholders’ preferences may shift over time, with new information and as the shareholder
body changes. The SEC’s rules should therefore ensure that shareholders wishing to opt back in
to the federal access regime do not face excessive impediments: opting back in should occur by
the same process as opting out, and should be similarly easy. 110 In particular, any firm that is no
longer subject to the federal access regime as the result of an opt-out resolution would again
become subject to the access regime once shareholders representing a majority of the outstanding
shares approve a resolution to that effect. 111 Public companies will therefore not be subject to the
federal access regime only if (i) an opt-out resolution has been passed by shareholders
representing a majority of the outstanding shares, and (ii) no subsequent resolution to opt back in
to the federal access regime has been passed by shareholders representing a majority of
outstanding shares.

3. Permissibility of Bylaws that Add to Access Rights Provided by Federal Law
Firms should be free to adopt bylaws that allow shareholders additional rights to access
the company’s proxy card beyond the baseline rights provided by the federal securities laws—
that is, either the access rights provided by the federal access regime, or a basis of no access
rights if shareholders have adopted a resolution opting out of the federal access regime. If most
110
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shareholders prefer an access regime that is more restrictive than the federal access regime, we
would expect the board to initiate a resolution opting out of the federal access regime, coupled
with a bylaw amendment to adopt the more restrictive access regime desired by shareholders. In
this way, shareholders would be able to opt out into alternative and more restrictive access
regimes instead of being able to opt out only into a no-access regime. If shareholders prefer a
regime that provides more expansive access than the federal access regime, they should be able
to adopt such an expansive access regime by augmenting the federal access regime with a bylaw
providing additional access rights.

4. Access to Arguments and Information Against Opting Out
The SEC’s rules should ensure that shareholders voting on a proposal to opt out of the
federal proxy access regime have access to information explaining both sides of the issue.
Without such a requirement, the company’s proxy statement, distributed to all shareholders
eligible to vote on the opt-out resolution, would contain only the views expressed by the
company’s board in favor of opting out—if a shareholder wished to present the case against
opting out the shareholder would have to engage in a costly proxy solicitation. To ensure that
shareholders voting on an opt-out proposal are informed about both sides of the issue, the SEC
could consider requiring companies to include in their proxy materials a standard statement,
drafted by the SEC, that explains the benefit to shareholders of proxy access provided by the
federal regime.

C. Beyond Proxy Access
As we have discussed, the debate on proxy access has led public companies and
corporate law firms to recognize and stress the value of allowing shareholders to opt out of
governance arrangements. This recognition should lead as well to a general reconsideration of
existing restrictions on shareholders’ ability to opt out of governance arrangements that make it
difficult for shareholders to replace directors. The adoption of SEC rules permitting shareholders
to opt out of the federal access regime should be accompanied by such reconsideration. The
SEC, Congress, and state legislatures should closely review these restrictions on shareholders
opting out of the prevailing arrangements governing corporate elections.
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Public officials could start by considering how to facilitate the ability of shareholders to,
among other things, (i) opt in to annual elections in companies that currently have a staggered
board, (ii) adopt bylaws governing elections without being required to include “fiduciary outs”
that eliminate much of the bylaws’ potential significance, (iii) limit the use of poison pills that
make it difficult to remove directors, and (iv) opt out of arrangements that make it difficult for
institutional investors to coordinate their actions. We hope that the recent realization by many
public corporations and corporate law firms of the value of private ordering and allowing
shareholders to opt out of corporate governance arrangements will lead them to support such
changes.

IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to contribute to the debate on the SEC’s proxy access reform and
governance reforms more generally. In particular, the Article has focused on “meta” objections
that accept the desirability of reforms but argue that such reforms should be left to adoption
through board action in response to shareholder proposals, against the background of the status
quo default rule. There are strong reasons for replacing the current no-access default. In
particular, there are reasons for believing that a proxy access regime is more likely to be
efficient, and, moreover, that the greater difficulty of opting out where disfavored by the board
(compared to where the board is in favor of opting out) provides a strong reason for adopting a
federal access regime as a default. We further identify certain principles that should guide any
opting out of the federal access regime. Our analysis has significant implications, beyond the
proxy access debate, for the choice of corporate default arrangements in general and for the
processes of opting out from such arrangements. We hope that our analysis will be useful to the
SEC as it decides how to move forward with proxy access reform, as well as to future
examinations of governance reforms in the critical areas of corporate elections and shareholder
rights.
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